This paper conducts powerful new tests of whether debt can mitigate the effects of agency and information problems. We focus on emerging market firms for which pyramid ownership structures create potentially extreme managerial agency costs. Our tests incorporate both traditional financial statement data and new data on global debt contracts. Our analysis is mindful of the potential endogeneity between debt, ownership structure, and value, and takes into account differences in the debt capacity of a firm's assets in place and future growth opportunities. The results indicate that the incremental benefit of debt is concentrated in firms with high expected managerial agency costs that are also most likely to have overinvestment problems resulting from high levels of assets in place or limited future growth opportunities. Subsequent internationally syndicated term loans are particularly effective at creating value for these firms. Our results support the recontracting hypothesis that equity holders value compliance with monitored covenants, particularly when firms are likely to overinvest.
Introduction
Can debt capital create value in firms suspected of having extreme agency problems?
Emerging markets provide an excellent laboratory to test the governance potential of debt since shareholders of emerging market firms typically suffer from misaligned managerial incentives, ineffective legal protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) ) and underdeveloped markets for corporate control.
1 Debt should create value for firms with high expected agency costs if the use of debt directly reduces overinvestment or allows firms to signal that they do not or will not overinvest.
In emerging markets, managers and families routinely employ pyramid ownership structures to give themselves control rights that far exceed their proportional cash flow ownership. Research shows that investors recognize these misaligned managerial incentives and discount firms with a separation of managerial control rights and cash flow rights. 2 We test whether debt mitigates the loss in value from these misaligned incentives.
Our investigation of the role of debt as a governance mechanism is unique because our data have wide variation in both expected agency costs and the types of debt contracts. In some firms, the separation between managerial control rights and cash flow rights is extreme -in others, there is no separation. Differences in financial disclosure standards, creditor rights, creditor base, and contract terms across debt markets result in different incentives to monitor borrowers and different costs to both managers and shareholders of entering a debt market. We 1 The international investment community is also aware of these governance shortcomings. Mark Mobius, manager since 1991 of the $1.2 billion Templeton Developing Markets Trust, comments that "corporate governance is not improving so why fight it? ... It's too Herculean a task and it's too embedded in the culture." [Karmin (2000) ].
Similarly, Nivatpumin and Parnsoonthorn (2001) report that the U.S.-based Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimates the agency costs of governance failures within Asia to be about 10 percent of annual sales. 2 See Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) , LLSV (2002), and Lins (2003) for non-U.S. evidence, and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) for evidence on U.S. firms for which formal control rights equal cash flow rights, yet informal control rights could be greater due to management entrenchment. Dyck also explicitly consider a firm's potential for overinvestment problems as measured by high levels of assets in place or limited future growth opportunities.
Cross-sectional tests using financial accounting data show that book leverage helps mitigate the loss in firm value attributable to the separation of management control and ownership. Further, we find that this beneficial effect of debt is concentrated in firms that have either a relatively high percentage of assets in place or few growth opportunities.
Event-study tests show significant differences in the abnormal returns associated with debt issued in different markets. Internationally syndicated term loan issues, which place implicit limitations on operating activity as a result of covenants and monitoring, have positive cumulative abnormal returns. The positive abnormal returns, in general, are associated with subsequent rather than initial loan issues. Moreover, the abnormal returns associated with these loans are positively correlated with management's separation of control and ownership and with the extent of assets in place. Initial issues of international public bonds, both Yankee bonds and Eurobonds, also lead to significant abnormal returns, but these returns are not correlated with management ownership structures.
Overall, our paper suggests that actively monitored debt creates value for shareholders of firms that face potentially extreme agency costs associated with misaligned managerial incentives and overinvestment problems. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relation between debt, value, and agency costs. Details on the sample construction and some summary statistics for our firms are presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains the empirical tests that examine the relation between debt capital, ownership structure, and firm value. Some concluding remarks are offered in the final section.
and Zingales (2002) , Nenova (2003) , and Doidge (2003) find that private control benefits are larger for firms from
Debt, value, and the separation of management ownership and control
Our investigation of the relationship between debt policy, management ownership structure, and firm value begins with a basic assumption: In equilibrium, there is a "meaningful conflict" between outside shareholders and management that results from the separation of ownership and control [Jensen and Meckling (1976) ]. In this agency setting, Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1993 , Stulz (1990) , Hart and Moore (1995), and Zweibel (1996) suggest that debt servicing obligations help to discourage overinvestment of free cash flow by self-serving managers. Even if a particular management group does not have a meaningful conflict, information asymmetry between managers and outsiders allows debt to create value because it gives management the opportunity to signal its willingness to pay out cash flows and/or be monitored by lenders [Leland and Pyle (1977) , Ross (1977) , Flannery (1986) , and Diamond (1991b) ].
The benefits to debt are greater if management has a large base of assets in place that it can exploit. Assets in place generate cash flow that can lead to either overinvestment or the outright diversion of corporate funds [Jensen (1986) , Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , and Hart and Moore (1998)]. If a firm has expected future growth opportunities, however, debt servicing requirements can limit management's ability to pursue positive net present value projects, leading to ex-post underinvestment [Myers (1977) ]. Since the relation between leverage and value is affected by a firm's debt capacity, we control for assets in place and growth opportunities in our analysis [Myers and Majluf (1984) , Smith and Watts (1992) , Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) , Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2001) , and Lemmon and Zender (2003) ].
Not all forms of debt are equally likely to curtail overinvestment. For instance, with short-term debt, managers must frequently face the scrutiny of the capital markets to refinance principal. However, this type of debt allows managers to signal firm quality by adding to the less-developed capital markets.
information exchange between management and external capital markets [Hart and Moore (1995 ), Flannery (1986 ), Diamond (1984 , 1991a ), and Lummer and McConnell (1989 ].
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In emerging markets, a domestically issued short-maturity debt contract is less likely to discourage overinvestment, because family groups or governments typically control the banks and can use them for their own purposes [La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2002) and ].
International debt markets, on the other hand, can provide emerging market firms with contracts that have higher financial disclosure standards, offer more effective creditor rights, and provide a better environment for monitoring. If credit rationing is severe in domestic markets, self-interested managers could be forced to borrow in international debt markets, subjecting themselves to increased monitoring or stricter reporting standards which should lessen minority shareholder expropriation. Alternatively, a well-managed firm whose value is discounted because of expected agency costs can issue debt in international markets in order to send a credible signal of managerial quality [Titman and Trueman (1986) and Cantale (1996) ]. Either way, international debt markets can create value through the resolution of expected agency costs.
While our research question is focused, the analysis relates to several large and often disjoint strands of literature. Many authors seek to identify whether, after accounting for potential endogeneity, the internal governance associated with a firm's ownership structure can influence firm value [Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) , Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2002), Lins (2003) , and Lemmon and Lins (2003) ]. We examine whether a complementary governance mechanismdebt policy -can also create value.
3 For an empirical study of short-term debt for U.S. firms, see Barclay and Smith (1995) .
Other research has examined whether certain types of debt issues lead to abnormal returns [Smith (1986) , Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , James (1987) , Kim and Stulz (1988) , Lummer and McConnell (1989) , Ramchand (2000a), and Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) ]. We examine relative abnormal returns across debt markets and within debt markets, conditioning on firm-specific factors that suggest expected agency problems. This approach allows us to comment on specific hypotheses about whether and how debt creates value. For instance, if debt creates value when there is a separation of managerial control and cash flow rights, the extent of the abnormal return should be positively correlated with the degree of this separation.
Finally, several authors argue that the direct and indirect disclosure costs borne by a firm's shareholders when it issues securities in international capital markets are linked to the benefits of increased investor recognition and liquidity [Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Miller (1999) , Ramchand (2000b), and Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) ]. Additionally, disclosure can be costly to managers, but beneficial for other shareholders, if it makes it more difficult for managers to engage in perquisite consumption, asset transfers, or the outright theft of earnings. These managerial costs of disclosure lead to an additional motivation for issuing in international capital markets. Emerging market firms can use private international debt markets to assure investors that managers' actions will be monitored without incurring the direct and indirect costs associated with increased public disclosure.
The ownership and capital structure study of McConnell and Servaes (1995) is the most closely related to ours. They investigate, for U.S. firms, whether the relation between debt and value depends upon the investment opportunity set of a firm. They find that book leverage is positively correlated with firm value when investment opportunities are scarce, which is consistent with the hypothesis that debt lessens the agency problem of overinvestment. 4 The root of the agency problem, however, lies in the separation of insider control and ownership, and not in the investment opportunity set. We provide a direct test of whether debt creates value when managerial incentives are misaligned.
Data

Sample selection
We use several different samples that incorporate our multiple sources of data. A "cross-sectional sample" consists of 1014 exchange-listed non-financial firms in 18 emerging markets with both ultimate ownership data for 1995/1996 from Lins (2003) and monthly stock return data over the previous five years from Datastream. The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.
Our measure of the degree of separation between managerial cash flow rights ownership and control, called "cash flow rights leverage," is the ratio of the management group's control rights to its cash flow rights. This measure incorporates both direct and indirect holdings of a firm's top managers and their family members. Indirect holdings refer to pyramid structures in which control rights to Firm A (i.e., the sample firm) are held through Firm B or Nominee Account B that has a stake in Firm A (i.e., the sample firm's blockholders).
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Cash flow rights held by management will be lower than control rights when indirect stakes with less than full ownership or shares with superior voting rights are present in a firm's ownership structure. 4 In a similar vein, Jagannathan and Srinivasan (1999) find that book leverage is beneficial for specialist firms that do not face strong product market competition as these firms might have greater agency problems. Database and in the internationally syndicated bank market using Capital Data's Loanware database. We obtain a debt issuance record using these sources for 547 exchange-listed nonfinancial emerging market firms covered by Worldscope; these constitute our "issuing sample."
We require information on an issue's signing date, principal amount of the contract, and contract maturity. Countries in the issuance sample closely track those in the cross-sectional sample except that the issuing sample includes Mexico and Venezuela (countries for which we have do not have ownership data).
We compile debt issuance data from the following markets: foreign bond markets (e.g., Yankee bonds); Eurobond markets; internationally syndicated bank issues such as term loans and revolving credits; and domestic public and private bond markets. The domestic bond coverage is limited to Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Singapore, Thailand, and Venezuela from 1991 -1997 and South Korea from 1994 -1997 . Since the issuing record is somewhat incomplete (e.g., we lack domestic bank issuance data) we verify that our sample of debt issues constitutes an economically significant portion of firms' total debt outstanding. Specifically, for each year we compare the overall stock of debt from firms' balance sheets with the aggregate flow of debt from our markets. On average, our debt flow data constitute 33% of the total stock of debt outstanding (range of 12% to 55%).
Since the flow of debt per year is likely to be well below the stock of debt, we believe that our issue data comprise a significant portion of firm's overall debt flows.
Finally, many of our tests use an "ownership issuing sample" of 252 firms with both a debt issuance record and an identified ownership structure.
25 percent, and cash flow rights leverage equals two. See Lins (2003) for further details on the computation of cash
Summary statistics
In order to identify whether debt mitigates managerial agency costs, it is important to measure leverage relative to a firm's assets in place since the benefits of debt are greater when a firm has a large base of assets in place. Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2003) argue that book leverage is the appropriate instrument for the ratio of debt to a firm's assets in place, so we use leverage measured using book values throughout our analysis. Moreover, firms are likely to be most concerned about book leverage ratios because bank loan covenants are written in terms of book value.
7 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the samples used in our tests. The crosssectional sample has a mean debt-to-assets ratio of 0.28, broadly consistent with the values found by Rajan and Zingales (1995) for firms in the U.S. and other developed countries. The average short-term debt to total debt ratio is 0.60. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) also find that firms in developing countries have substantially higher short-term debt ratios than firms in developed countries. Mean cash flow rights leverage is 2.13, implying that the average management group in these emerging markets is able to turn one cash flow right into more than two control rights.
The second and third columns of Table 1 show that firms with a debt issuance record are, on average, larger, more levered, and have a lower proportion of short-term debt to total debt than firms in the cross-sectional sample. Our summary statistic differences indicate that larger emerging market firms are better able to tap the longer-maturity public and international debt markets, a finding consistent with the U.S. firm results of Barclay and Smith (1995 
Empirical analysis
Cross-sectional analysis
The objective of our cross-sectional tests is to draw inferences about the relation between firm value, leverage, and the separation of management group control and ownership, while controlling for a number of other factors. The task is complicated because it can be argued that firm value, leverage, and ownership structure are all jointly determined.
We address the potentially endogenous relation among these variables (and account for other factors that could affect each of them) by estimating a three-stage least squares regression model, where a valuation equation is the structural equation, and a leverage equation and an ownership equation are the others. In so doing, we go beyond previous work that considers only endogeneity between firm value and ownership structure. One shortcoming of any instrumental variable technique is that it requires the identification of some number of exogenous variables that plausibly affect only value, or leverage, or ownership, but not all three.
For robustness, we also estimate the firm value structural equation using ordinary least squares.
We also verify that our results hold if we estimate a two-stage least squares model, equation by equation. Finally, because debt is most likely to benefit firms with high levels of assets in place and/or low growth opportunities, we estimate the model for subsets of firms based on proxies for these parameters.
Consistent with previous work on the relation between ownership structure and firm value, we use an approximation of average Tobin's Q as a proxy for firm value in our crosssectional regressions. We compute Tobin's Q as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets less the book value of equity in the numerator and the book value of assets in the denominator, using accounting data predominantly from fiscal year-end 1996.
To directly test the ability of debt to mitigate agency costs, we require a measurement of the valuation impact of debt conditional on the level of separation between management control and ownership. We capture this conditional effect by including in the firm value equation an interaction term between cash flow rights leverage and debt, in addition to the stand-alone cash flow rights leverage and debt variables. If agency costs are capitalized into firm values, then the stand-alone coefficient on cash flow rights leverage should be negative. A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that debt can mitigate the effect of agency problems.
Our structural equation controls for firm size, measured as the log of total assets in U.S.
dollars. We include the ratio of capital expenditures to assets as a proxy for growth opportunities; however, if managers routinely overinvest, this ratio will instead pick up inefficient investment choices. 8 Finally, we include country and industry indicator variables in the structural equation because both country and industry factors are likely to affect Q values.
Industry groupings are based on Campbell (1996) .
The leverage equation uses the debt-to-assets ratio as the dependent variable, Tobin's Q and cash flow rights leverage as the simultaneously determined variables, and controls. We include the four determinants of leverage advocated by Rajan and Zingales (1995): Tobin's Q, the percentage of tangible assets (net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets), firm size, and profitability (operating income-to-total assets). Cash flow rights leverage could be positively related to leverage, since managers who lever their cash flow rights into greater control rights might also use financial leverage to augment the assets under their control. We also include country dummy variables in the leverage equation since the use of debt finance is likely to vary by country.
The ownership equation uses cash flow rights leverage as the dependent variable, Tobin's Q and leverage as simultaneously determined variables, and controls. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Cho (1998) , and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , unique control variables in this equation are the beta from a regression of a firm's monthly stock return on its local market MSCI index for a 60-month period as well as the standard deviation of a firm's stock return over this period. Both measures attempt to capture the risk inherent in stock ownership. They also capture the potential for insiders to make money on the shares they hold.
The ownership equation also includes size and percentage of tangible assets, since these variables could also affect whether management directly holds shares. Table 2 reports the results of the three-stage least squares estimation for the crosssectional sample of firms. The structural equation (1) shows an unconditional coefficient on cash flow rights leverage of -0.484, which indicates that an increase in the separation between managerial control rights and cash flow rights is negatively related to firm value. This result suggests that a management group could positively impact firm value by selling its interest in an indirect holding and using these proceeds to purchase shares directly.
More important for our analysis, the coefficient of 1.132 on the interaction between cash flow rights leverage and the debt ratio suggests that debt plays a positive role in alleviating agency problems. However, the coefficient is not large enough to overcome the negative unconditional effect of debt found in the equation. 9 Overall, the structural equation indicates that some debt may be alleviating agency costs, while other debt may be simply increasing financial risk or exacerbating agency problems.
9 The overall economic effect of a change in leverage from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile for a firm with mean cash flow rights leverage of 2.13 and mean Tobin's Q of 1.48 is as follows: The positive interaction term effect, 1.132 x 2.13(0.42 -0.12) = 0.723 is added to the negative unconditional debt effect, -3.765(0.42 -0.12) = -1.130, for a net change of -0.407 in Tobin's Q which, when divided by 1.48, equals a 28% reduction in Tobin's Q.
The leverage equation (2) indicates that leverage is positively related to both firm size and cash flow rights leverage. Both these findings are consistent with our predictions and with the findings of Kim and Sorensen (1986) for U.S. firms. In our simultaneous equations framework, we do not find that Q has an effect on leverage, a finding consistent with the U.S.
firm results of Roper (2001). Asset tangibility and profitability also have no effect on leverage ratios. The ownership equation (3) shows that debt is positively related to the separation between managerial cash flow rights and control rights, indicating endogeneity between these variables. Firm size is negatively related to cash flow rights leverage, and the stock ownership risk proxies are not significant in this equation.
For comparison purposes, Table 2 also reports the results of simple OLS estimates for the firm value structural equation (model 2). Although we do not believe that this model adequately captures the relationship between firm value, debt, and ownership, we note that the coefficients support the same conclusion about the ability of debt to mitigate agency costs. 10 As an indication of robustness, the Table 2 results hold when we use market value leverage ratios rather than our preferred book value leverage measures (results not tabulated).
In Table 3 , we investigate whether the ability of debt to mitigate managerial agency costs depends on how likely a firm is to face overinvestment problems. We split the sample into firms with above-and below-median levels, by country, of the proxies for assets in place (percentage of tangible assets) and growth opportunities (Tobin's Q). Equation (1) of Panel A shows that the interaction term between debt and cash flow rights leverage is positive and significant only for firms with a high percentage of assets in place. Equation (1) of Panel B shows that the interaction term between debt and cash flow rights leverage is positive and significant only for 10 We also estimate an OLS regression of the leverage equation (not tabulated), and find results broadly similar to those of Rajan and Zingales (1995) -book leverage is positively related to firm size, and negatively related to Q and profitability, but is not significantly related to asset tangibility.
firms with few growth opportunities. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that debt is particularly effective at alleviating agency problems when firms are likely to suffer from overinvestment.
We next test whether short-term debt is best suited for reducing the effect of potential overinvestment problems (results are untabulated). We segment the sample into firms with above-and below-median levels, by country, of short-term debt to total debt and re-estimate the three-stage least squares model. In the firm value structural equation, we find a marginally significant positive coefficient on the interaction between debt and cash flow rights leverage for firms with relatively short debt maturities (p-value = 0.11); the interaction coefficient is insignificant for long-maturity firms. These results provide weak evidence that short-term debt is able to mitigate agency problems. Unfortunately, our book leverage data do not allow us to distinguish between intensively monitored short-term debt and debt issued by domestic lenders with strong ties to a firm or the government.
The cross-sectional regressions indicate that debt can limit the value loss attributed to the separation of managerial ownership and control, particularly for firms with high levels of assets in place and few growth opportunities. The evidence also suggests that short-term debt could be relatively effective at this task. Leverage itself, however, is consistently negatively related to firm value.
Event Study Analysis
As some debt contracts are more likely to be effective at mitigating managerial agency problems than others, and book leverage measures cannot distinguish between debt types, we conduct tests of the relation between agency costs and the issuance of specific debt contracts.
We measure changes in shareholder value resulting from individual debt issues using traditional event study methods. We estimate a market model with Scholes-Williams (1977) betas over an estimation window beginning 120 trading days before and ending 20 trading days before the issue date. We proxy for a country's market return using Morgan Stanley market capitalizationweighted indices. Daily local-currency firm-level price data are provided by the Global Securities
Prices database within FACTSET. Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported for a six-day event window that includes one day prior to issue, the issue date, and four subsequent trading days.
We use the issue date of the debt financing agreement as the event date, rather than an announcement date. Our search of public news sources reveals that when announcements occur, they are almost always on or just after the issue date. Also, even if an announcement precedes an issue, there is still some uncertainty at the announcement date as to whether the financing will actually be completed. Measuring an announcement effect thus does not fully reflect the benefit (if any) of a completed debt contract [Mikkelson and Partch (1986) ]. During our search, we check for confounding public announcements in the two-week period before and after each debt issue date. 11 We find less than 50 such confounding events and verify that our results hold in magnitude and significance when these issues are removed from our analysis.
The event study analysis allows us to draw inferences on the particular mechanism by which debt can add value. When interpreting abnormal returns, we assume that the value of debt comes from increased disclosure and/or monitoring which together serve to reduce agency costs. However, as Smith (1986) points out, at least some of the value enhancement (if any) 11 To the extent that announcements precede the issue date (see Miller (1999) and Bhattacharya et al. (2000) ), this will lessen our chance of finding significant abnormal returns around the issue date. James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) Firms issuing these must meet stringent registration requirements as well as provide timely financial statements that adhere to U.S. GAAP. Such disclosure is potentially costly to both firms and managers. The firm must pay out-of-pocket costs associated with regulatory filings and these filings also could provide rival firms with proprietary information. Stringent
Newswire (January 1985 -December 1997 , Dow Jones News Service (June 1979 -December 1997 , Emerging Markets disclosure is costly to managers if new information on managerial ownership structures, investment, and operating decisions causes them to consume fewer private benefits of control.
Thus, a Yankee bond issue by an emerging market firm could be an effective signal to outside shareholders because information asymmetries and managerial agency costs in emerging markets are often severe.
Debt markets with a commitment to monitoring can also create value for outside shareholders whenever information asymmetries and agency costs are pronounced. Monitoring can either serve as a screening mechanism or help align self-interested managers' actions by encouraging them to pursue ex-post efficient investment strategies [Diamond (1991b) ].
Creditors in private debt markets can more readily commit to monitoring since the creditor base is typically concentrated [Diamond (1989) ].
Internationally syndicated bank contracts, in particular, are likely to be intensely monitored. According to Howcroft and Solomon (1985) , the lead manager in syndicated bank issues has a fiduciary duty to monitor the firm and inform syndicate members when the firm is in technical default, and most syndicated agreements are governed by New York state law. This fiduciary duty provides additional incentives to monitor that are absent in private bond markets.
While privately placed domestic bonds also have a concentrated creditor base, strong ties between firms and domestic lenders in emerging markets could often discourage these lenders from performing due diligence and monitoring. markets, a result consistent with evidence in Cantillo and Wright (2000) , and these bond issues are larger and longer-dated than internationally syndicated bank issues.
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The final two columns, however, show that the internationally syndicated bank market remains a vital source for external capital for emerging market firms. Internationally syndicated issues constitute the greatest proportion of both issues (63%) and total issuance volume (54%)
of the various debt instruments. Untabulated annual statistics show that, for each year, syndicated term loans represent at least 36% of total debt issue proceeds (to a maximum of 55%), far exceeding the other forms of debt capital that we study.
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Despite its relative importance, the internationally syndicated bank market has been largely ignored in capital structure studies.
14 Table 5 reports the cumulative abnormal returns associated with debt raised in different markets. Limited daily security price data keeps our event study to 1348 issues. Across all types, debt issues lead to a statistically insignificant 0.13% average abnormal return, but when we partition debt issues according to marketplace of issue, we find two significant results. First, privately placed domestic bond issues lead to an average abnormal return of -1.04%, indicating that domestic bonds do not appear to provide certification benefits. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find insignificant abnormal returns for private debt contracts issued by U.S. firms.
Second, we find that internationally syndicated bank term loans generate average abnormal returns of 0.52% for outside shareholders. Bank offerings by U.S. firms have also been shown to create value [James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) ]. While other authors attribute these gains to the uniqueness of the bank-borrower relationship, we explore whether these gains are directly related to expected agency costs.
12 Our data sources document very few non-U.S. foreign bond issues (e.g., Samurai bonds). We exclude these issues from our analysis because tests with such a small subset would lack power, and because reporting and disclosure characteristics of these foreign issue markets are not comparable to those for U.S.-issued foreign bonds. 13 Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2000) document this pattern at the country level for aggregate financial flows.
Our analysis so far averages the effects of multiple issues by firms in a particular marketplace of issue. In fact, the sequencing of issues across various debt markets is also likely to drive the valuation impact of debt. If debt creates value because of increased financial disclosure, then abnormal returns should be higher for debt contracts with higher levels of disclosure, such as public international bond markets, when firms have not received certification from alternative debt markets such as private international debt markets. Thus, finding that a firm's initial international debt offering in either the U.S. Yankee bond market or Eurobond market leads to positive abnormal returns would indicate that increased disclosure is likely to be driving the value creation.
On the other hand, successful subsequent issues in private debt markets can create value
by allowing managers to demonstrate their commitment to meet debt service requirements and to abide by covenants [Fama (1985) , Lummer and McConnell (1989) , and Diamond (1991b)].
Thus, a finding of positive abnormal returns for subsequent private bank contracts, such as internationally syndicated term loans, would provide support for the recontracting hypothesis.
We identify a firm's initial international debt issue within our sample of debt issues, and define all other issues as subsequent international issues. Because of incomplete historical data, we cannot verify that our initial international debt issue is the first international debt issue in the entire history of the firm.
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For robustness, we also partition a firm's issues in a given marketplace into the initial offering and secondary offerings. We perform univariate and multivariate analysis to investigate whether the value created by key debt contracts, if any, is related to a separation between managerial control and cash flow rights. As in our crosssectional tests, we also examine whether the gains to outside shareholders that result from 14 Some notable exceptions are Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Esty and Megginson (2003) . 15 A search of the news sources detailed in footnote 11 reveals no evidence of international debt issues that precede the initial international debt issue identified within our sample.
incremental debt issues are concentrated in firms with few growth opportunities or substantial assets in place. Table 6 shows that there is no creation of shareholder value when a firm's subsequent international debt issue is a U.S. Yankee bond or public Eurobond, in contrast to the results of Kim and Stulz (1988) .
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In untabulated results, we also find evidence that initial Yankee bond offerings have higher average abnormal returns than initial public Eurobond offerings (1.90% compared to 0.88% -each significant at the 10% level). While sample sizes are too small to draw reliable inferences, we believe that the more stringent reporting requirements in the Yankee bond market provide a more effective signal for managers from emerging markets.
When a firm's subsequent international issue is an internationally syndicated term loan, cumulative abnormal returns average 0.94%, and 58% are positive (significant at the 1% level).
The right-hand columns of Table 6 show that subsequent international issues of term loans have a 1.61 percentage point higher average CAR than initial international issues of term loans. 16 To the extent that these debt issues reveal information on expected cash flows, the new information should be greatest in the initial international issue, and this could account for at least part of the positive CARs we observe.
For robustness, we also sort each internationally syndicated term loan issue according to whether it is the first syndicated term loan issued by a firm or is a subsequent term loan issue.
This segmentation offers a more precise test of the recontracting hypothesis that investors benefit from learning that a firm has been able to withstand bank monitoring pressures when agency problems are expected to be severe. We find that subsequent issues of term loans generate a 0.99% average abnormal return, significant at the 1% level (result not shown), a finding similar to that reported by Lummer and McConnell (1989) for bank loan renewals by U.S. firms. Taken together, the positive average CARs for subsequent syndicated term loans support the recontracting hypothesis that investors will pay more for firms that show they can comply with bank loan agreements.
Privately placed bonds have relatively low out-of-pocket costs and are unlikely to transmit proprietary information. Despite these potential advantages, we find that firms whose initial international issue is a privately placed bond do not reap shareholder gains. Across both public and private bonds, subsequent international bond offerings do not have significant positive average abnormal returns. This could be because the creditor base is too diverse to credibly commit to effective monitoring.
One of our key objectives is to test whether the value created by any particular debt contract is related to the extent of an individual firm's managerial agency problem. We partition firms into those with a separation of managerial control and ownership (above-median cash flow rights leverage) and those without such separation. To further assess the potential for overinvestment problems, we sort firms according to whether their time-series average values over the 1990 -1996 period for percentage of tangible assets and Tobin's Q are above or below the median value for all issuing firms. In Table 7 , we conduct a univariate analysis of these parameters and the CARs from the two types of debt shown to create value in Table 6 : initial international issues in the public U.S. or Eurobond markets, and subsequent international offerings of internationally syndicated term loans.
Panel A of Table 7 provides no evidence that the abnormal returns associated with initial public U.S. and Eurobond offerings are correlated with our proxy for agency costs. In Panel B,
we do find that the abnormal returns associated with subsequent offerings of internationally syndicated term loans are positively related to cash flow rights leverage. While both above-and below-median cash flow rights leverage firms experience positive abnormal returns when recontracting in the syndicated term loan market, the difference between the two groups, 1.19 percentage points, is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result indicates that firms with potentially extreme managerial agency problems benefit most from subsequent international offerings of syndicated term loans.
We next test the Jensen (1986) debt and overinvestment argument that debt issues should be most beneficial to shareholders of firms with substantial amounts of assets in place.
Across both types of debt issues, we find that the value created by debt is concentrated in firms with an above-median percentage of tangible assets, which supports the Jensen hypothesis.
Finally, we observe that the value created by both initial international public bonds and subsequent internationally syndicated term loans is concentrated in firms with below-median Tobin's Q values. Our findings confirm the result of McConnell and Servaes (1995) that debt creates value in firms with few growth opportunities.
The univariate analysis of Table 7 suggests that the positive CARs associated with subsequent syndicated term loans occur primarily in firms likely to face agency costs because they have high management cash flow rights leverage, high percentages of assets-in-place, or low growth opportunities.
We next conduct a multivariate cross-sectional analysis of our CARs. If shareholders benefit from debt contracts because they lessen the effect of agency problems, then we expect the CARs of a debt contract to be positively related to our proxies for agency problems. If, instead, debt contracts add value primarily because they transmit new information about a firm's prospective cash flows, then debt contract CARs should not be related to agency cost proxies. (1) and (4) are similar to the first equation reported in Table   2 of the cross-sectional analysis. Regressions (2) and (5) contain interactions between cash flow rights leverage and the proxy for assets in place, while regressions (3) and (6) have an interaction between cash flow rights leverage and the proxy for growth opportunities. For initial international public U.S. and Eurobond offerings, Table 8 provides no evidence that abnormal returns are associated with the extent of agency problems. In fact, the results suggest the opposite. Regressions (1) through (3) show that CARs are negatively correlated with the degree of separation between control and ownership. While this result suggests that the value created by Yankee bond and public Eurobond offerings is not related to expected managerial agency costs, we would view the results cautiously, given the small number of observations. Nonetheless, we are unable to explain this counterintuitive result.
The evidence from regression (4) for subsequent internationally syndicated term loans once again shows that the value created by subsequent syndicated term loan issues is positively correlated with cash flow rights leverage. The coefficient of 0.184 (0.184%) indicates that, compared to shareholders in the median firm with no cash flow rights leverage (a value of one), shareholders in a firm that has cash flow rights leverage at the 90 th percentile (a value of six) obtain a 92 basis point higher excess return (computed as 0.184 x 5) from a subsequent international term loan issue.
When we split the sample into firms with above-and below-median assets in place in regression (5), we find that shareholders of firms with greater amounts of assets in place and high management cash flow rights leverage benefit the most. The interaction coefficient of 0.268 (0.268%) indicates that when a subsequent term loan is issued by a high assets-in-place firm, shareholders of a firm with cash flow rights leverage of six obtain excess returns 134 basis points higher than those of a firm with a cash flow rights leverage value of one. Similarly, regression (6) shows that when a subsequent term loan is issued, shareholders in firms with below-median growth opportunities and cash flow rights leverage at the 90 th percentile experience returns 121 basis points higher than those for low-growth opportunity firms with no cash flow rights leverage. Taken together, our results indicate that monitored debt creates value for firms that have both high expected managerial agency costs and an asset base or growth opportunity set that reflects expected overinvestment problems.
Conclusion
Emerging market firms have potentially extreme managerial agency problems. We examine financial statement data and detailed global debt issuance data to test whether debt capital is able to reduce the impact of agency problems. We provide new evidence that debt creates shareholder value for firms that face potentially high managerial agency costs.
Cross-sectional tests using financial statement data indicate that debt mitigates the reduction in firm value that accompanies a separation between a management group's control rights and its proportional cash flow ownership. This incremental benefit of debt is concentrated in firms most likely to have overinvestment problems because they have either high levels of assets in place or limited growth opportunities.
Our event study tests provide a rich set of results for subsequent issues of internationally syndicated term loans -loans that place implicit limitations on operating activity as a result of covenants and monitoring. First, these loans earn positive cumulative abnormal returns.
Second, these cumulative abnormal returns are positively related to the separation of control and ownership in the management group. Third, this positive relation is concentrated in firms with a high percentage of assets in place or few growth opportunities. From an economic perspective, when a firm with high assets-in-place issues a subsequent internationally syndicated term loan, the return when there is a 90 th percentile separation of managerial control and cash flow rights is 134 basis points higher than the return when no separation of control and ownership exists.
These results support the recontracting hypothesis that shareholders value compliance with monitored covenants, particularly when firms are most likely to face extreme agency problems.
Event study tests show that initial issues of public international bonds (Yankee bonds and Eurobonds) also lead to significant abnormal returns, but these returns are not correlated with management ownership structures. These gains are consistent with the hypothesis that international public markets certify firm quality with their substantial disclosure requirements.
Taken altogether, our results indicate that shareholders benefit from intensively monitored debt in circumstances where managers are most likely to exploit shareholders and where information asymmetry is severe enough that they cannot reasonably infer what managers are doing with a firm's funds. Number of firms 547 Table 1 Summary statistics
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Summary statistics for cross-sectional sample, issuing sample and ownership issuing sample. Firm fundamental data are reported for fiscal year end 1996 and come from Worldscope. CAPX to assets is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to book assets. Total debt debt to assets is defined as long-term debt to book assets. The ratio of short-term debt to total debt is set equal to zero in cases where there is no debt in the capital structure of a firm. Percentage of tangible assets refers to net property, plant and equipment divided by book assets. Tobin's Q is computed as market value of equity plus book assets less book value of equity all divided by book assets. Cash flow rights leverage is computed as management group control rights divided by management group cash flow rights and includes both pyramid and non-voting equity effects [Lins (2003)].
The cross-sectional sample contains emerging market firms for which cash flow rights leverage for 1995/1996 can be obtained from Lins (2003) and which also have monthly stock return data over the previous five years available from Datastream. The issuing sample contains all nonfinancial publicly traded emerging market firms found in Worldscope for which a debt issuance record can be obtained using CapitalData Loanware database and the SDC New Issue database and that have daily stock price data in Global Securities Price database in FACTSET. The ownership issuing sample contains all firms in the issuing sample that are also in the cross-sectional sample. Model (1) reports the estimated coefficients from a jointly determined system in Eq. 1, Eq. 2 and Eq. 3. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Model (2) reports OLS parameter estimates and robust standard errors following White (1980) . Models include unreported country-specific intercepts and industry-specific intercepts (based on Campbell (1996) industry groupings) where indicated. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. P-values are reported based on a F-test of model specification. The Adjusted R 2 is reported for model (2). Three-stage least squares analysis of the jointly determined system (Tobin's Q , debt to assets, and cash flow rights leverage) and ordinary least squares analysis of the dependent variable Tobin's Q are reported in models (1) and (2). All regressions are estimated using the cross-sectional sample of 1014 firm observations. Cash flow (CF) rights leverage x debt to assets is an interaction between cash flow rights leverage and the debt to assets ratio. Operating income to assets is EBITDA divided by book assets and this ratio is divided by 100 for reporting purposes. Beta is computed from a regression of the monthly stock return on the MSCI country level index return using the 60 month period prior to December 31, 1996. Standard deviation of stock return is computed using the firm level stock return over the same period. All remaining variables are defined in Table 1 .
Cross-sectional Sample Issuing Sample
Debt to assets
The effect of leverage and ownership structure on firm value Table 3 Three-stage least squares analysis of the jointly determined system (Tobin's Q, debt to assets and cash flow rights leverage) are reported. All regressions are estimated using the cross-sectional sample of 1014 firm observations. All variables are defined in Table 1 and Table 2 . Panel A reports coefficients based on subsamples of firms whose percentage of tangible assets falls above and below that of the country median firm. Panel B regressions are estimated on subsamples of firms whose Tobin's Q fall above and below that of the country median firm. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Regressions include unreported country-specific intercepts and industry-specific intercepts (based on Campbell (1996) [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] from Worldscope. Issue size and maturity are measured using the average proceeds in millions of U.S. dollars and maturity of issues in a particular debt market. Table 5 Cumulative abnormal returns by market place of issue
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported for six-day event window which includes one trading day prior to issue, the issue date and the subsequent four trading days. Results are based on the issuing sample of 1,348 issues described in Table 4 and are reported for the full sample and subsamples based on debt markets. Abnormal returns are defined using a normal return model incorporating Scholes-Williams (1977) betas which are estimated using returns from 120 trading days prior to the issue date, excluding a 20 day event window centered around the issue date. Generalized Sign Z tests the hypothesis that the fraction of positive returns in the abnormal period is significantly different from the fraction of positive returns in the estimation period. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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ZStatistic Percent Positive
TStatistic
Publicly Placed Bonds
Initial Table 6 Cumulative abnormal returns and sequencing of issues in international debt markets
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported for six-day event window which includes one trading day prior to issue, the issue date and the subsequent four trading days. Results are based on international issues for the issuing sample described in Table 4 . For each debt offering, we partition the offering based on whether it is a firm's initial international offering or a subsequent international offering. Abnormal returns are defined using a normal return model incorporating Scholes-Williams (1977) betas which are estimated using returns from 120 trading days prior to the issue date, excluding a 20 day event window centered around the issue date. Generalized Sign Z tests the hypothesis that the fraction of positive returns in the abnormal period is significantly different from the fraction of positive returns in the estimation period. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The two right hand columns report the difference in average CARs between the initial and subsequent offerings and a t-test (unequal variances) of this difference. Table 7 Cumulative abnormal returns and cash flow rights leverage, assets in place, and growth opportunities Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported for six-day event window which includes one trading day prior to issue, the issue date and the subsequent four trading days. Results are reported for the subsamples of issues that have positive average CARs found to create value in Table 6 . Panel A presents average CARs for all firms whose initial internationl debt offering is in the public U.S. market or Eurobond market. Panel B presents average CARs for all internationally-syndicated bank term loan offerings that could not be classified as a firm's initial international debt offering. Within each panel, issues are divided according to whether the issues belong to firms with above-or below-median cash flow rights leverage, percentage (pctg) tangible assets or Tobin's Q.
CAR
Abnormal returns are defined using a normal return model incorporating Scholes-Williams (1977) betas which are estimated using returns from 120 trading days prior to the issue date, excluding a 20 day event window centered around the issue date. Generalized Sign Z tests the hypothesis that the fraction of positive returns in the abnormal period is significantly different from the fraction of positive returns in the estimation period. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The two right hand columns report the difference in average CAR between the above-and below-median offerings and a t-test (unequal variances) of this difference. Abnormal returns are defined using a normal return model incorporating Scholes-Williams (1977) betas, estimated using returns from 120 trading days prior to the issue date, excluding a 20-day event window centered around the issue date. Weights in the GLS analysis are proportional to the variance of the CARs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are based on an F-test of model specification. For ease of reporting, all coefficients have been multiplied by 100.
Generalized least squares analysis of the dependent variable, average CAR, on cash flow rights leverage and controls is reported.
Results are based on the subsamples of issues that are found to create value in Table 6 . Within each subsample, three models are estimated. Models (1) and (4) regress CARs on cash flow rights leverage and controls reported in Table 2 . In models (2) and (5), the coefficient on cash flow rights leverage is allowed to vary according to whether a firm's time series average percentage tangible assets is above or below the country median firm. In models (3) and (6), the coefficient on cash flow rights leverage is allowed to vary according to whether a firm's time series average Tobin's Q is above or below the country median firm. 
